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1 INTRODUCTION
The study of the relation between contractual savings and personal ~or free! sav-
ings has a venerable history. Feldstein ~1974! used the framework of an extended
life-cycle model to study the depressing effect social security wealth may have
on household savings. On the basis of aggregate U.S. data he estimates that so-
cial security wealth depresses personal saving by about 30 to 50 percent. Feld-
stein and Pellechio ~1979! study the same issue, but use microdata. They find a
considerable depressing effect of social security wealth on ordinary fungible
wealth. Their range of estimates includes the possibility that each extra dollar of
social security wealth is offset by a corresponding drop of one dollar in fungible
wealth.
Munnell ~1976! investigates the impact of coverage by social security and pen-
sions on private saving. She uses microdata for the U.S. and finds, using once
again a life cycle framework, that both social security coverage and pension cov-
erage depress private saving. The depressing effect of pension coverage on sav-
ings is, however, lower than the total contributions to private pensions. Hence the
net effect on savings is still positive. Since social security is not funded, its effect
on savings is unambiguously negative.
Diamond and Hausman ~1984! use essentially the same framework as men-
tioned above, but their analysis is more sophisticated from an econometric view-
point. They use a panel of males ~the National Longitudinal Survey 1966–1976!,
eliminating all individuals with wealth below $4000 in 1966. This selection is
motivated by the possibility that low wealth individuals may be liquidity-con-
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trained if it is difficult to borrow against future income. This would make the
conventional life cycle model less applicable as a description of behavior. Dia-
mond and Hausman take into account individual effects and the endogeneity of
retirement. They estimate a proportional hazard model to describe retirement be-
havior. They then use this model to construct instruments for retirement age in a
model of wealth accumulation. They find that both social security and pensions
reduce free savings, with the effect of social security being bigger than the effect
of pensions. Their estimates of these saving depressing effects are, however, sub-
stantially smaller than obtained by other authors.
Since generally the estimates of the effects on savings of social security and
pensions vary quite a bit across different studies, Dicks-Mireaux and King ~1984!
perform extensive tests of robustness for the effect of social security wealth and
pension wealth on private savings. They use Canadian household data, employing
the methodology advocated by Leamer ~1978!. Their results suggest that the net
negative effect of social security and private pensions on household savings ~the
‘displacement effect’! is rather small, in the order of 0.25. Of course the exact
effect depends on prior assumptions.
Bernheim ~1987! questions the routine use of actuarial valuation of social se-
curity benefits ~i.e. future benefits are weighted with survival probabilities! in
view of the absence of perfect annuity insurance markets. He shows that under a
rather wide variety of circumstances simple discounting of future benefits gives a
better measure of social security wealth than actuarial discounting. In his empiri-
cal analysis he finds that regressions based on simple discounting work substan-
tially better than regressions based on actuarial discounting. The implied displace-
ment effect of social security on private savings is much larger than found by
others.
Mirer ~1992! investigates the robustness of Bernheim’s findings, in particular
for the assumption that mortality rates are constant. Essentially, his findings is
that neither simple discounting nor actuarial discounting may give a very good
approximation of the annuity value of social security benefits.
In a recent paper, Gale ~1995! re-evaluates the literature so far and points out
a number of biases in the existing literature. Some of these have been acknowl-
edged by earlier authors, others are new. Gale notes that the prototypical equa-
tion in this literature has the following form:
W5 Za 1 bP1 e, ~1.1!
where W is a measure of non-pension wealth or saving, Z is a vector of explana-
tory variables, P is a measure of pension status ~e.g. present discounted value of
a future stream of pension benefits, to be called pension wealth!, a and b are
parameters to be estimated, and e is an error term. The displacement effect of
private pensions on savings ~or offset as he calls it! is measured by b. If b is
equal to 21, there is complete displacement, i.e. for every extra dollar of pension
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wealth non-pension wealth falls by an equal amount. Gale notes eight different
sources of bias when using an equation of this type:
1. Controlling for cash earnings rather than total compensation. If one compares
two individuals with equal earnings but with different levels of pension wealth
the parameter b will pick up both the substitution effect of the difference in
pension wealth and the income effect of the differences in total life time re-
sources. By way of a number of examples Gale shows that this can lead to a
serious underestimation of the displacement effect. He also shows how this
bias will vary across the life cycle.
2. Ignoring differences in life expectancy. This also implies a downward bias,
since a higher life expectancy implies both a higher pension wealth and a
higher non-pension wealth. If expectancy is omitted a spurious positive corre-
lation between these two quantities is induced.
3. Omitting retirement age. It may be expected that an individual with a more
generous pension scheme is likely to retire earlier than someone with a less
generous scheme. But such a person has an incentive to save more while work-
ing to prepare for a longer retirement period. This induces a positive correla-
tion between pension wealth and non-pension wealth.
4. Omitting age. Assuming that people run down both their non-pension wealth
and their pension wealth after retirement ~pension wealth falls with age by
construction!, older people will have both lower non-pension wealth and lower
pension wealth than younger people. This induces a positive correlation be-
tween both types of wealth if age is omitted as an explanatory variable.
5. Heterogeneity in savings propensity. Most likely, people who tend te save a
lot also prefer to have generous pension plans. To the extent that a pension
plan reflects a choice by an individual, this induces positive correlation be-
tween both types of wealth, and this biases the estimated displacement effect
towards zero.1
6. Pension wealth should be measured net of taxes. Otherwise one overestimates
pension wealth and hence underestimates the associated regression parameter
b.
7. Narrow measures of non-pension wealth. The literature shows a large varia-
tion in measures offsets and a tendency to find smaller offsets if a narrower
measure of non-pension wealth is being used.
8. Measurement error in pension wealth. This will mostly induce a bias in the
estimate of b towards zero. Since pension wealth is notoriously hard to mea-
sure, this is a difficult problem.
1 Although in The Netherlands occupational pension plans are typically mandatory, one can still
imagine that people with a high savings propensity will tend to choose jobs with good pension plans.
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In the current paper we also investigate the displacement effect of social security
and pensions on savings, but in a somewhat different institutional context, namely
that of The Netherlands. Very little research has been carried out to date on the
displacement effect of social security and pensions on private savings in The
Netherlands. Kuné ~1981! used aggregate time-series data for the period 1952-
1978 in a regression equation where personal saving of households is explained
by various sorts of income, the interest rate, inflation, the amount of public sacial
security contribution, and the amount of pension saving. He finds insignificant
effects for social security contributions on savings ~and with an unexpected sign:
if more is contributed, personal savings go up!. The pension savings do have a
significantly positive effect on total personal savings and in some specificatoins
this effect does not differ significantly from one. To interpret these results one
should notice that the left hand variable ‘personal savings’ is the sum of a num-
ber of components, including pension savings. Thus a coefficient equal to zero
for pension savings would imply a one-for-one displacement of free savings by
pension savings, whereas a coefficient equal to one would imply a zero displace-
ment rate.
As acknowledged by Kuné, the use of social security contributions in a given
year as an indicator of social security wealth is somewhat hard to defend in a life
cycle framework. Van der Laan and Zwezerijnen ~1983! take up the task of con-
structing a wealth variable representing the present value of the future old age
benefits. ~The Netherlands has a public old age benefit system covering every
citizen, see below.! They then run a regression with aggregate data where savings
per household are explained by disposable income per household, average house-
hold size, inflation, and social security wealth. They find a negative but not very
significant effect of social security wealth on household savings.
Draper ~1994! uses a representative agent model where a consumer maximizes
utility from consumption, nonhuman wealth and pension rights. He finds some
displacement of free savings by pension savings. However, his estimates are partly
based on parameters that had to be fixed a priori, so that the conclusions may not
be robust.
In this paper we use micro ~panel! data to investigate the impact of the amount
of pension and social security wealth a household has at its disposal on hte house-
hold’s savings. In section 2 we give some background on relevant facts and insti-
tutions in The Netherlands. In section 3 we describe the construction of variables
needed in the empirical analysis, in particular pension wealth and social security
wealth. To this end we also need to model the income process of households.
In section 4 we then go on to investigate the effect of social security and pen-
sion wealth on household savings. This is done in line with the literature dis-
cussed above, by specifying equations which explain the private wealth of house-
holds on the basis of income, pension and social security wealth, and various
demographic characteristics.
Section 5 presents and discusses results. Section 6 concludes.
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2 SOCIAL SECURITY, PENSIONS, AND SAVINGS IN THE NETHERLANDS
2.1 Institutional Framework
Everyone in The Netherlands is covered by a general old age pension starting at
the age of 65. The level of the benefit is independent of other income but does
depend on household composition. For a couple benefits are equal to the mini-
mum wage.
In addition, the vast majority of employees are covered by an occupational
pension scheme of one sort or another. In Pensioenkaart van Nederland ~‘Pen-
sion Map of The Netherlands’ to be denoted by PN ~1987! from now on!, it is
estimated that in 1985 more than 80% of all employees were covered by an oc-
cupational pension scheme. Most likely this percentage has increased since then.
Table 1 gives an impression of the importance of the general old age pension and
other pensions for the incomes of the elderly in 1989. One observes that among
the elderly 20% do not draw benefits from a private pension. This does not im-
ply that these households do not have any income other than social security ben-
efits ~i.e. the general old age pension benefits!. Out of the 242,000 households
with only social security benefits, 142,000 draw additional income from other
sources like capital income ~Meuwissen ~1993!!. To put the numbers in the table
in some further perspective, we note that in 1989 the after-tax income associated
TABLE 1 – IMPORTANCE OF GENERAL OLD AGE PENSION BENEFITS AND OTHER PEN-
SION BENEFITS ~1989!
with other pensions only general old age
pension benefits
number
3 1000
total inc.
per househ.
Dfl. 3 1000
other pension
benefits
Dfl. 3 1000
number
3 1000
inc. per
household
Dfl. 3 1000
H.h. comp.
single 395 26.7 8.4 113 20.2
couple 426 40.3 13.7 67 38.5
other h.h. 121 23.8 7.2 54 19.5
Age
65-69 330 36.4 13.2 66 29.1
70-74 249 33.1 11.3 68 25.0
75- 383 28.9 8.0 108 23.4
Total 962 32.6 10.6 242 25.4
~Source: Meuwissen ~1993!!
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with a general old age pension benefit was equal to Dfl. 13,416 for singles and
Dfl. 19,368 for couples.
In general, if an employer offers a pension scheme, then participation in such
a scheme is compulsory. More than 99% of the pension schemes is of the de-
fined benefit type whereas the remainder ~0.6%! is of the defined contribution
type. More than 72% of the pension benefits are defined on het basis of final pay,
the remainder being a mixed bag of various combinations of final pay, fixed
amounts, and average pay.
Combining the effects of the general old age pension scheme and the private
pension schemes leads to the following before-tax replacement rates for those in-
dividuals who have contributed for a sufficient number of years: 34% receives
less than 60% of the final pay, 27% receives between 60 and 69, 20% receives
between 70 and 79%, 19% receives at least 80% of final pay ~PN~1987!!. One
should keep in mind that after tax the replacement rates are usually substantially
higher. For instance, if the before-tax replacement rate is 70 than the after-tax
replacement rate exceeds 90 ~Keesen ~1990!!.
2.2 Savings in The Netherlands; Aggregate Data
Figure 1 gives a time series of both contractual and free savings for the period
1982–1995. To appreciate the graphs, it is of some importance to be precise about
Figure 1 – Breakdown of Dutch household saving, 1982–1995 ~source: National Accounts!
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the definition of household savings. Household savings are defined as disposable
income minus consumption. Disposable income includes wages ~also imputed
wages of self-employed!, social security benefits, income transfers from the
government, corporate income ~dividends, rent, imputed rent for owner-occupied
housing!, interest received, pension and life insurance benefits, and capital in-
come of pension funds and life insurers. Taxes and social security premiums are
subtracted. Consumption is defined to be equal to the purchase of goods and ser-
vices. This implies in particular that the purchase of durables is measured as con-
sumption.
The aggregate savings measure can be split up in two parts, contractual sav-
ings, defined as wealth increases of pension funds and life insurers, and the re-
mainder which is called non-contractual or ‘free’ savings.
One notices a fairly constant contractual savings rate over the period consid-
ered, and an apparent decline of the free savings rate after 1990.
2.3 Savings in The Netherlands; Microdata
For the empirical analysis in the next sections the Socio-Economic Panel has been
used.2 The SEP has been run by Statistics Netherlands since 1984 and has been
patterned after the Panel Study of Income Dynamics of the University of Michi-
gan. The SEP is representative of the Dutch population, excluding those living in
special institutions like nursing homes. The sample size of the SEP is approxi-
mately 5000 households. Between 1984 an 1989 households were interviewed
twice a year, in April and in October. Since 1990 interviews take place once a
year ~in May!. We will employ the waves of 1987 through 1991.
From 1987 onwards the April questionnaires include questions concerning as-
sets and liabilities. Information is collected for the following assets: 1! checking
accounts; 2! saving and deposit accounts; 3! saving certificates ~certificates of de-
posit!; 4! bonds, mortgage bonds; 5! shares, options, and other securities; 6! value
of the primary residence; 7! other real estate ~not used for own residence!; 8!
value of the car~s!; 9! cash value of the life insurance mortgage; 10! claims
against private persons ~friends, acquaintances!3; 11! other assets.
The survey collects information on the liabilities of every respondent. In the
SEP questionnaires of April 1987 and April 1988, the following categories are
listed: 1! personal loan or revolving credit; 2! purchase on credit, hire-purchase;
3! remaining mortgage debt; 4! other loans; 5! other debt. In 1989, the CBS sub-
2 A large part of the analysis presented in this section has been carried out by Alessie, Lusardi, and
Aldershof ~1997!.
3 As of 1989, the questionnaire does not include the asset component ‘claims against private per-
sons,’ but it retains the component ‘other assets.’ As of 1990, the self-employed do not have to record
assets and liabilities. We have therefore exluded the self-employed from the analysis. As of 1990, the
‘cash value of the life insurance mortgage debt’ cannot be computed from the SEP data. However, the
1987–1989 data suggest that this is a rather small item ~cf. Alessie, Lusardi, and Aldershof ~1997!!.
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stantially revised the questions concerning the liabilities. Ten liability categories
can now be distinguished: 1! personal loans; 2! revolving credit; 3! debt with
mail order firms, retail debt; 4! other purchases on credit; 5! hire-purchase; 6!
remaining mortgage debt; 7! equity-based loans; 8! debt with relatives and
friends; 9! other outstanding debt, unpaid bills; 10! other debt. Household assets
and liabilities are obtained by respectively summing all assets and liabilities of
each respondent in the household. Net worth is obtained by subtracting total li-
abilities from total assets. In this paper we also consider the variable financial
wealth, which is equal to net worth minus housing equity ~i.e. the value of the
primary residence plus the cash value of the life insurance mortgage minus the
mortgage debt and minus the value of the real estate. For confidentiality reasons,
the values of the assets and liabilities have been top-coded for each category and
set at the value of Dfl. 999,997 if the values exceed that amount.4
Summary statistics on the size and composition of net worth have been pre-
sented by Alessie, Lusardi, and Aldershof ~1997!. Alessie, Pradhan, and Zandvliet
~1993! compare the asset and liability data with some external data sources, in
particular with ~aggregate! data from the ‘Collective Bank Study’ ~CBO!, the
Dutch Central Bank, and the Society of Real Estate Agents. The comparison with
external data sources is limited, however, since there are no aggregate statistics
for some of the asset and liability components. In addition, the SEP does not
oversample rich households, which is important for comparisons with macrodata.
Alessie, Pradhan, and Zandvliet ~1993! find that the data on home-ownership ~the
most important asset category! are consistent with external data sources. The same
is true for checking accounts and the debt items. However, savings and deposit
accounts seem to be underestimated in the SEP. This problem is also encountered
in the U.S. SCF and is rather common in wealth surveys ~Avery, Elliehausen,
and Kennickell, 1988; Davies, 1979!. Meuwissen ~1994! compares the SEP data
with a data set constructed from administrative sources ~e.g. tax social security
records!. While the ownership rate of most asset components compares reason-
ably well across the two data sets, the conditional mean of shares and options is
substantially higher in the data from tax records than in the SEP.
One of the questions in the April 1988 questionnaire was:
Do you expect to be able to save money in the next 12 months?
1 yes, certainly
2 yes, maybe
3 probably not
4 certainly not
4 For asset categories such as the value of real estate and the value of someone’s own company,
top-coded values are present. Very few households in our analysis are affected by the top-coding,
partly because it is heavily concentrated among the self-employed which we have excluded from the
sample.
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For those who answered ‘yes, certainly’ or ‘yes, maybe,’ the following question
then was:
What would you spend this money on?
More than one answer is possible here.
car
house
holidays
durable goods
extra income ~e.g. interest!
unforeseen circumstances
old age
children
other purpose, that is ...
no particular purpose
For some of the categories in the latter question, Figure 2 presents the propor-
tions of respondents who mentioned these categories ~the graphs have been con-
Figure 2 – Motives for saving across age ~source: Alessie, Lusardi, and Aldershof ~1997!
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structed by a kernel regression of the zero-one variables corresponding to each
category on age!. Clearly, old age is not a very important motive to save money,
although this motive becomes slightly more prominent among middle-aged
people. There are of course various ways to interpret this result. One possibility
is that the coverage by social security and private pensions is considered to be so
generous that one need not worry about old age very much. This would then
indicate a displacement effect on savings.
To get some further feeling for the data we present in Figure 3 two graphs of
savings across age groups for the middle year of our sample period. The graphs
are based on kernel regressions of quartiles.
Savings in a given year is defined here as the difference in wealth between the
beginning and the end of the year. Notice that although net savings drop to a low
level at the age of 60, dissaving ~at the median! hardly occurs. Figure 3a makes
clear that there is considerable dispersion across households in savings within a
given year. At all ages the first quartile of the savings distribution is negative. If
we exclude housing then median savings are more or less zero, with sizeable
dissavings for a substantial fraction of the population. One should be aware of
the fact that measurement of household wealth may be subject to sizeable error.
Figure 3a – Distribution of savings across age in 1989 ~including housing; source: Alessie, Lusardi,
and Aldershof ~1997!!
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Since saving in a given year is defined as the difference between two quantities
measured with error, saving defined this way will probably suffer from substan-
tial measurement error itself.
3 THE INCOME PROCESS, SOCIAL SECURITY WEALTH AND PENSION WEALTH
We assume that individuals who are not retired yet form rational expectations
concerning their future social security and pension benefits.5 Under this assump-
tion we can use a model of income processes of each individual or household to
construct Social Security Wealth ~SSW! and Pension Wealth ~PW!. For individu-
als who are retired, the contruction of SSW and PW is much simpler as we as-
sume that their benefits will grow at an annual rate of 1%. This percentage is
consistent with medium-term projections of the real per capita growth rate of the
Dutch economy.
5 One may question what sort of expectations are rational exactly. We have assumed that individu-
als expect the current rules to continue. So, for instance, individuals do not take into account the
possibility that social security would become less generous in the future.
Figure 3b – Distribution of savings across age in 1989 ~excluding housing; source: Alessie, Lusardi,
and Aldershof ~1997!!
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Actually, since pension benefits are generally linked to earnings and social se-
curity benefits to non-capital income, we have to model two income processes,
one for the construction of SSW and one for the construction of PW.
3.1 Non-capital Income and SSW
For the construction of SSW the most important aspect is the evolution of income
around age 65. For single people the situation is quite simple, once they qualify
they get social security benefits ~i.e. the general old age pension benefits!. For
couples the situation is much more complicated, as for instance the general old age
pension received by a household head who is over 65 will depend on the non-
capital income of his ~or her! spouse in case she ~or he! is under 65. As a result,
we have to model the non-capital income for both heads of households and
spouses. Appendix A provides an extensive description of the models employed.
3.2 Earnings Process for PW
Again we model separate processes for heads and spouses. The details are to be
found in Appendix B. There is one important complication, which should be men-
tioned here. If one simply takes annual earnings as a dependent variable, then the
earnings path of spouses shows a strong hump shape. The reason for this is that
older cohorts of women appear to work considerably fewer hours per week than
the younger cohorts. The number of waves of the panel used appears to be too
small to allow for cohort effects explicitly. We have ‘solved’ the problem by stan-
dardizing the earnings of spouses by dividing by the number of hours worked per
week and used that as a dependent variable. In the forecasts the assumption is
that the number of hours worked will remain constant in the future.
3.3 Construction of SSW and PW
Given the equations for non-capital income, the construction of SSW is straight-
forward, though extremely tedious. In all cases we assume a one percent real
income growth across the board, i.e. the intercepts of the equations are increased
annually in an appropriate manner. See Appendix A for details.
For the construction of pension wealth it is not only necessary to predict earn-
ings, but also to use the probability that someone will leave the labor force and
either become disabled or retire early. Estimation of these probabilities is part of
the modelling described in Appendix B. If one leaves the labor force at a certain
age, say into disability, then we can approximate the income as of that moment
as a function of earnings in the year prior to the exit. By taking the various exit
routes out of the labor force into account, we can calculate the final pay at age
65 and also the number of years counting towards the calculation of pension ben-
efits.
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In the calculation of the present value of future benefits we have somewhat
arbitrarily assumed a three percent real interest rate. Since the analysis is based
on a comparison of the SSW and PW of different households, the exact interest
rate is not particularly important as it influences SSW and PW of all households
in the same direction.
4 WEALTH REGRESSIONS
As a starting point we take the basic life cycle permanent imcome hypothesis. In
its basic formulation the life cycle PIH model with homothetic intertemporally
additive preferences implies the following consumption equation:
Ct5 ktF~11 r!At2 1 1 (
t 5 t
L
~11 r!t2 tEtytG ~4.1!
The term in square brackets is total wealth, i.e. present wealth6 plus the dis-
counted sum of expected future incomes, where the expectation is taken at time
t; Ct is comsumption at time t. The parameter kt is inversely related to life ex-
pectancy. For instance, if we assume that instantaneous utility is quadratic in con-
sumption, with constant bliss level, and time preference equals the interest rate,
then kt is equal to ~1/@(t 5 tL ~11 r!t2 t#, where L2t is the number of years one
may expect to live after t. If the bliss level is allowed to shift over time, then the
equation will in general have an additive term representing taste effects.7 Ignor-
ing taste effects for the moment and using the intertemporal budget constraint
At5 ~11 r!At2 1 1 yt2Ct , ~4.2!
we obtain the following equation for the evolution of private wealth over time:
At5 ~12 kt!@~11 r!At2 1 1 yt#2kt (
t 5 t1 1
L
~11 r!t2 tEtyt . ~4.3!
6 That is, exclusive of SSW or PW and measured at the end of the year.
7 Let the bliss level in period t be equal to cbr. Then the expression for consumption at time t for
household h becomes:
Ct5 ktFS~11 r!At2 1 1 (
t 5 t
L
~11 r!t2 tEtytD2 S(
t 5 t
L
~11 r!t2 tEt~cbt 2 cbt!DG.
The time-varying bliss levels break the homotheticity of preferences in lifetime wealth. For the rest
one immediately sees the additive dependence of consumption on the time-varying bliss levels.
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Since wealth is measured per household, income also has to be defined as house-
hold income. To form the expectation of future household income we estimate a
separate model for household income, similar to the models described in Appen-
dix A.8 With this model in hand one can construct expected future incomes of
households by constructing a time path such that it passes through the income in
the year of observation, while taking into account the 1% real income growth per
annum assumed before. Obviously we only have to sum through the age of 64,
since after that we can use the SSW and PW variables constructed before. Fur-
thermore, we allow wealth at a given moment to be influenced by demographic
variables and taste shifters by adding such variables to the right hand side of
~4.3!.9 Let us collect these latter variables in a vector xt and let us denote
(r5 t1 164 ~11 r!t2 rE tyr by PYpt , then the final specification of the equation to be
estimated is
Aht5 b8xht1 d1Ah,t2 1* 1 d2yht* 1 d3PYh,pt* 1 d4SSWht* 1 d5PWht* 1 eht ,
~4.4!
where we have added a subscript h to identify the household under consideration.
The asterisks indicate normalization with respect to life expectancy. That is,
Ah,t2 1* 5 ~12 kht!Ah,t2 1, yht* 5 ~12 kht!yht* , PYh,pt* 5 khtPYh,pt, SSWht* 5 khtSSWht.
The permanent income hypothesis as formulated here implies complete dis-
placement. That is, d3 and d4 in equation ~4.4! both have to be equal to 21. A
value of these parameters greater than minus one implies a less than complete
displacement.
4.1 Results
The proper estimation method for ~4.3! will have to rely on the assumed prop-
erties of the error term eht. Most likely, measured wealth will suffer from con-
siderable measurement error and hence OLS applied to ~4.3! will be heavily bi-
ased. Secondly, fixed effects may play an important part in the sense that some
people are more thrifty than others and hence one might find a spurious positive
relationship between private pensions and free savings ~people who choose a job
because of its excellent pension scheme are also the ones who save more!. Hence
we estimate three variants of ~4.3!. The first one is ~4.3! as it stands, the second
one moves the term ~12 kt!~11r!At2 1 to the left-hand side of the equation,
hence this equation reads:
8 Household income is not simply the sum of incomes as used in sections 3.1 and 3.2. In 3.1 and
3.2 we ignored variables like family allowance, alimony, etc.
9 That means we drop the assumption of constant bliss levels.
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Sht* [Aht2 ~12 kt!~11 r!Ah,t2 1
5 b8xht1 d2yht* 1 d3PYh,pt* 1 d4SSWht* 1 d5PWht* 1 eht . ~4.5!
This amounts to imposing the restriction that d151 in ~4.3!. By moving the term
~12kt!~11r!At21 to the left-hand side the measurement error problem has been
taken care of at the cost of an extra assumption. One may think of Sht* as a gen-
eralized savings measure. We have also considered estimates with Sht* replaced by
observed savings ~i.e. the first difference of wealth!, but the outcomes are broadly
the same.
In the third variant we allow for fixed effects in ~4.4!. Furthermore we con-
sider two wealth definitions, total net wealth ~including home equity! and finan-
cial ~or liquid! net wealth ~excluding real estate!. The reason for the latter dis-
tinction is that home equity is non-liquid. This may create liquidity constraints,
which would make the model inconsistent with the life cycle hypothesis as we
are using it. In all variants we have considered two specifications, one with and
one without demographic variables. Although the demographic variables are of-
ten insignificant, we only present variants with demographics included to guard
against any omitted variable bias. The estimates for the variables of interest do
not appear to be very sensitive to inclusion or exclusion of the various controls.
Since the controls are not of interest in themselves, we do not present their
coefficients.10
The estimates are presented in Table 2. In the first row the theoretical values
of the coefficients are given, if the LCH were exactly right.
Various noteworthy features emerge from Table 2. First of all the estimation
of equation ~4.3! in its form for total net worth yields estimates that have the
wrong sign for social security and pension wealth, whereas the coefficients for
current income and permanent income have the right sign, but are significantly
different from their theoretical values. Only the coefficient for lagged wealth cor-
responds to theory. Furthermore, lagged wealth explains the bulk of the variance
in current wealth. These results are qualitatively the same for financial wealth,
although for financial wealth social security wealth has the right sign ~but a large
standard error!. The estimation results with the savings measure as a dependent
variable show a very small R2 confirming our intuition that the measurement of
savings as the first difference of wealth suffers from substantial measurement er-
ror. Of the two significant coefficients, the one for pension wealth has the wrong
sign. The significantly positive coefficient for pension wealth indicates the pres-
ence of a fixed effect, where people who choose jobs with good pensions are
also the ones who provide for their old age in different ways.
10 Demographics included are: # children below 6, # children 7-12, # children 13-17, family size,
gender of head of household, a cubic spline in the age of the head of household with knots at ages
30, 40, 50, 60, 65, and 85.
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This possibility is accounted for by the fixed effects specification, which is
therefore the preferred specification. The number of observations for the fixed
effects specification is lower than for the other one, since we need observations
per household for at least three consecutive years, whereas for the specification
without fixed effects alle observations with at least two consecutive years of in-
formation could be used. We note that now pension wealth also has an insignifi-
cant coefficient for both wealth definitions, but still with the wrong sign. Social
security wealth has a significantly negative effect indicating a strong displace-
ment effect on private savings.
It is striking that pension wealth and social security wealth would have such
different effects. One of the problems may be that the information used with re-
spect to pension entitlement is far from perfect ~see Appendix B! in the sense
that there is no direct information about the level of future benefits that people
can expect. We have essentially assumed that everyone who is covered and that
the rules of the biggest pension fund in The Netherlands ~the civil servants pen-
sion fund! apply to all occupational pension funds. This limits variability in the
sample and makes pension wealth a function of current income. Since current
income also enters as a separate explanatory variable this easily introduces severe
multicollinearity. There is one piece of information about pension coverage that
has not been used yet. Respondents in the panel were asked in 1988 whether
they had any entitlements to pension benefits. We have used this variable by set-
ting pension wealth to zero for all repsondents who said they had no entitlement
TABLE 2 – ESTIMATION RESULTS ~t-VALUES IN PARENTHESES!
Ah,t2 1* yht* PYh,pt* SSWht* PWht* R2 Nobs
Theoretical predictions 1 1 21 21 21
Dependent variable
Aht ~total! 1.03 0.26 20.08 0.003 0.28 0.86 7495
~206! ~4.44! ~21.04! ~0.01! ~4.93!
Aht ~financial! 0.95 0.16 20.07 20.14 0.21 0.72 7495
~132! ~3.62! ~21.12! ~20.96! ~4.85!
Sht* ~total! – 0.27 20.05 0.05 0.31 0.03 7495
– ~4.72! ~20.72! ~0.27! ~5.53!
Sht* ~financial! – 0.16 20.09 20.20 0.18 0.01 7495
– ~3.52! ~21.47! ~21.33! ~4.06!
Sht* ~total! FE – 0.16 21.01 22.19 0.16 6848
– ~1.68! ~21.54! ~22.58! ~1.40!
Sht* ~financial! FE – 0.12 0.23 22.63 0.17 6848
– ~1.55! ~0.36! ~23.60! ~1.78!
Explanation: FE: fixed effects. Nobs: number of observations.
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~18%!. The results of this variant change a bit relative to what has been reported
in Table 2, but qualitatively they are the same.
Yet another variant is to compute the present value of pension and social se-
curity wealth by simple discounting rather than by actuarial discounting, as sug-
gested by Bernheim ~1987!. This variant also leads to slightly different results;
the signs of the coefficients do not change. The results for this variant are given
in Appendix C.
If we assume that the fixed model for Sht* is approximately well-specified then
it would tell us quite different stories about the displacement effects of SSW and
PW. For both wealth definitions the coefficient of PWht* is not significantly dif-
ferent from zero, but in both cases the coefficient is significantly different from
minus one at reasonable significance levels. Thus we can reject the possibility of
one-for-one displacement of free savings by pension savings, but not the possi-
bility of the displacement effect being zero. The outcomes for SSW indicate a
significant displacement effect. In particular, we can reject the null of a zero dis-
placement effect, while a null of a complete offset cannot be rejected.
As a final comment on the quality of the model specification we notice that
for total wealth the coefficient of PYh,pt* is not significantly different from its theo-
retical value. The coefficient of yht* is too low.
5 CONCLUDING REMARKS
We will summarize the hypotheses we have investigated in this paper. The per-
manent income life cycle hypothesis implies full displacement between pension
savings and social security on the one hand and private ~non-contractual! savings
on the other hand. This implication is the result of a number of assumptions,
including perfect capital markets and the absence of precautionary motives. The
hypothesis of full displacement is equivalent with coefficients being equal to mi-
nus one for the variables SSWht* and PWht* . If the hypothesis is not corroborated
by the data we ask the question whether there is partial or more than full dis-
placement ~the coefficients corresponding to SSWht* and PWht* are smaller than
zero! or no displacement at all ~the coefficients corresponding to SSWht* and
PWht* are greater than or equal to zero!. For pension wealth we find no displace-
ment and for social security we find ~more than! full displacement.
To evaluate the robustness of our results, it is of interest to confront our out-
comes and procedure with the list of possible biases provided by Gale ~1995!, cf.
section 1: Our specification does not only control for cash income, but actually
for lifetime resources, hence the first pitfall mentioned by Gale has been avoided.
Similarly, we have accounted for differences in age and for heterogeneity in sav-
ings propensities ~by using a fixed effects specification!, and we have computed
pension wealth net of taxes. Furthermore, our net wealth measure is quite broad.
As to differences in life expectancy, we have only corrected for differences
across sexes, since we simply do not know the individual life expectancies be-
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yond what can be learned from a life table. It is not quite clear whether this will
really bias the results, since this procedure reduces measured variation in social
security wealth and pension wealth relative to their true variation. Such reduction
in variation is somewhat similar to the instrumentation of life expectancy ~in this
case by age and sex!, which need not induce bias.
We score less well on the remaining sources of bias. We have not endog-
enized retirement age. We did model variations in labor force exits, but in an
exogenous manner.
A serious problem with our analysis lies in the measurement error in pension
wealth, as already indicated in the previous section. Clearly, it would be impor-
tant to have data available that contain more direct information on pension en-
titlement. In addition to the data problems, one may question the specification of
the utility function underlying the wealth equations we have estimated. In par-
ticular one would like to allow for the possibility of precautionary savings and
for imperfect capital markets. Our choice of a quadratic utility function and the
neglect of liquidity constraints has allowed for a closed form solution for house-
hold wealth. More general specifications, allowing for instance for liquidity con-
straints, habit formation or precautionary motives make it impossible to find such
a closed form solution. In that case one has to revert to simulation studies as in
Carroll ~1992!, which greatly complicates the model. Such complications are far
beyond the scope of the present paper.
If our present finding, i.e. that displacement effects of pension wealth are not
100%, were to keep up even if we employed better data on pension entitlements
and used more general models, it seems that a policy of encouraging broad cov-
erage by private pension schemes is an effective means to maintain a high level
of savings.
APPENDICES
APPENDIX A: CALCULATION OF SOCIAL SECURITY WEALTH
In the calculation of social security wealth we distinguish the following regimes:
1. One person household, 65 years and over
2. One person household, younger than 65
3. Couple, both the head and the partner are at least 65 years old
4. Couple, head is at least 65 years old, partner younger than 65
5. Couple, partner is at least 65 years old, head younger than 65
6. Couple, head and partner younger than 65, head at least as old as the partner
7. Couple, head and partner younger than 65, partner older than the head
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In Table A1 the computation of social security wealth is explained for each of
these regimes. Social security wealth is defined as the actuarially discounted sum
of current and future social security benefits ~AOW benefits!. In case of the first
three regimes the SS benefit does not depend on the level of income earned be-
fore retirement: the SS system is basically a flat rate system which is financed on
a pay-as-you-go basis. The level of SS benefit is equal to the full-time minimum
wage for couples of which both the head and partner are at least 65 years old.
Singles who are older than 64 receive an SS benefit which is equal to 70% of the
minimum wage. Since 1988 the SS benefit is income dependent for households
belonging to groups 4 or 5.11 In principle, such households receive at least 70%
of the SS benefit of a couple ~i.e. the SS benefit of a one person household!.
Depending on the income of the spouse, one may receive a bonus which depends
on the income INCPti of the spouse who is younger than 65. The maximum bo-
nus is equal to AOWA ~30% of the net minimum wage!. This implies that house-
holds receiving the maximum bonus, receive the ‘full’ SS benefit of a couple.
The relation between the bonus and the income of the spouse is as follows:
Bonusti5 xptiI@xpti uxpti. 0#~xpti! ~A1!
where
xpti5AOWA2 0.66yptiI@xpti uxpti. 0#~ypti!
yp i5 INCPti2 0.15minwage
INCPti5 non-asset income of the spouse who is younger than 65
minwage5minimum wage
Some comments on Table A1 are in order. First, we have to make some assump-
tions concerning the real interest rate and growth rate of the SS benefit.We as-
sume the interest rate to be equal to 3% and the growth rate of the SS benefit
equal to 0%. Second, we assume that apart from the fact that head or spouse
may die, no changes in the family composition occur in the future. For instance,
this assumption implies that we do not allow for marriages or divorces. The as-
sumption might be reasonable for the older single person households, but it is
quite a strong assumption to make for the younger households. However, the cal-
culations become much more complicated if we allow for such possibilities. The
third assumption concerns the survival probabilities of the head and the spouse.
We assume that these probabilities are mutually independent.
Given the assumptions made above, the calculation of social security wealth is
rather straightforward for the households belonging to groups 1 till 4. For the
other groups social security wealth is income dependent due to the existence of
11 Before 1987 households in groups 4 and 5 received the same amount as households in group 3.
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TABLE A1 – FORMULAE OF SOCIAL SECURITY WEALTH
Group Household type Social security wealth
1 Single,
ageh. 565 SSWi5 (
t 5 agehi
~ S11 g11 rD
t 2 agehi
phagehi,t AOWS
2 Single,
ageh, 65 SSWi5 (
t 5 65
~ S11 g11 rD
t 2 agehi
phagehi,t AOWS
3 Couple,
ageh. 5agep. 565 SSWi5 (
t 5 agehi
~ S11 g11 rD
t 2 agehi
~~phagehi,t1ppagepi,t*2phagehi,t ppagepi,t*!AOWS1phagehi,t ppagepi,t*AOWA!
where t*5t2~ageh2agep!
4 Couple,
ageh. 565,agep, 65 SSWi5 (
t 5 agehi
641 agehi2 agepiS11 g11 rD
t 2 agehi
~phagehi,t AOWS1 phagehi,t ppagepi,t*Bonusi! 1
(
t 5 651 agehi2 agepi
~ S11 g11 rD
t 2 agehi
~~phagehi,t1ppagepi,t*2phagehi,t ppagepi,t*!AOWS1
phagehi,t ppagepit*AOWA!
where t*5t2~ageh2agep!
5 Couple,
agep. 565,ageh, 65
analogous to 4 ~switch agehi and agepi!
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6 Couple,
65. ageh. 5agep SSWi5 (
t 5 65
641 agehi2 agepiS11 g11 rD
t 2 agehi
~phagehi,t AOWS1 phagehi,t ppagepi,t*Bonusi! 1
(
t 5 651 agehi2 agepi
~ S11 g11 rD
t 2 agehi
~~phagehi,t1ppagepi,t*2phagehi,t ppagepi,t*!AOWS1
phagehi,t ppagepi,t*AOWA!
where t*5t2~ageh2agep!
7 Couple,
65. agep. ageh
analogous to 6
i: 5 household index
agehi: 5 age of the head of household i
agepi: 5 age of the partner
phageh, t: 5 probability that the head of the household aged agehi still lives at age t
~survival probability of the head!12
ppagep, t: 5 survival probability of the partner
AOWS: 5 AOW benefit of a single person in the sample year
AOW: 5 AOW benefit of a couple
AOWA: 5 AOW2AOWS
Bonusi: 5 bonus received when the head is at least 65 years old and the partner younger than 65 or vice versa
g: 5 real growth rate of the AOW benefit
r: 5 real interest rate
SSWi: 5 social security wealth of household i
12 The survival probabilities are taken from CBS ~1992!.
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the bonus. In order to calculate social wealth for these regimes we need two mod-
els which explain non-capital income of the head and partner. We model the evo-
lution of non-capital income for heads of households as follows:
Dlog~yit! 5 dt1 b8Dsplinesit1 eit ~A2!
where yit is non-capital income of individual i in year t and dt are year dummies.
Splinesit is a cubic spline in age with knots at 18, 25, 35, 45, and 65 years of
age. 13 This equation has been estimated separately for three education classes: 1!
primary or lower secondary education, 2! higher secondary education, 3! higher
than secondary education. By taking first differences fixed effects are allowed in
the log income equation in levels. We have used income observations of the fol-
lowing years: 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, and 1990. Since age, cohort and time ef-
fects cannot be disentangled, 14 we have to make an identifying assumption. We
chose to drop one time dummy in the log income equation in levels. This iden-
tifying assumption is equivalent to estimating equation A2 without a constant
term. 15 The estimation results are presented in Table A2.
The income process for the partner has to be modelled differently because in
the sample a sizeable fraction of partners does not receive any income. In order
to take this phenomenon into account we specify a random effect probit equation
explaining whether the spouse will have income or not. This random effect probit
model contains the following right-hand side variables: a full set of year dum-
mies, gender, dummies indicating the education level, dummy variables indicat-
ing the sector of education, and a cubic spline age function with the following
knots: 18, 25, 35, 45, and 65. The estimation results of the random effects probit
model are presented in Table A3. For those spouses who have an income, we
estimate a similar model as model ~A2!. 16 For the spouse we do not allow for
education-specific effects in the income equation. The estimation results of the
spouses’ income equation are also presented in Table A3. Notice that the fixed
effect of the log income equation cannot be estimated for those spouses in the
sample who did not receive any income between 1986 and 1990 ~this period is
covered by our sample!. In order to compute social security wealth we need pre-
dictions of the fixed effect for all spouses in the sample. Therefore, we have es-
timated a model which explains the fixed effect by some non-time-varying indi-
vidual characteristics.
13 The spline regressors are constructed in such a way that the estimated parameters can be inter-
preted as the ordinates of the spline function. Details concerning the contruction of the spline varia-
bles can be found in Poirier ~1976!.
14 In a fixed effect model cohort effects are subsumed in the fixed effect.
15 Jappelli ~1995! makes a similar identifying assumption.
16 Notice that we implicitly assume that the error terms of the random effects probit model on the
one hand and the error term in the fixed effect income equation on the other hand are mutually in-
dependent.
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TABLE A2 – ESTIMATION RESULTS NON-CAPITAL INCOME EQUATION OF THE HEAD
Primary or
lower
secondary
education
Higher
secondary
education
Higher than
secondary
education
year88 estimate 20.01 0.01 20.01
std. error 0.02 0.01 0.03
t-value 20.31 1.09 20.31
year89 estimate 0.02 0.03 0.00
std. error 0.02 0.01 0.03
t-value 1.18 2.20 0.17
year90 estimate 0.11 0.11 0.07
std. error 0.02 0.01 0.02
t-value 7.26 11.05 3.05
spline25 estimate 0.71 0.50 0.51
std. error 0.18 0.18 0.24
t-value 3.89 2.83 2.13
spline35 estimate 0.97 0.74 0.99
std. error 0.28 0.23 0.35
t-value 3.52 3.24 2.83
spline45 estimate 1.10 0.73 1.20
std. error 0.37 0.28 0.46
t-value 2.97 2.58 2.62
spline64 estimate 0.97 0.77 1.08
std. error 0.56 0.41 0.72
t-value 1.74 1.87 1.50
s2 estimate 0.09 0.05 0.09
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TABLE A3 – ESTIMATION RESULTS INCOME MODEL SPOUSE, A: RANDOM EFFECTS PRO-
BIT MODEL
Variable estimate std. error t-value
year86 14.257 1.806 7.895
year87 14.519 1.809 8.026
year88 14.686 1.811 8.108
year89 14.876 1.809 8.223
year90 15.255 1.815 8.406
gender 25.341 0.878 26.083
edlev2 0.678 0.252 2.695
edlev3 1.319 0.372 3.546
edlev4 1.519 0.292 5.206
edlev5 2.761 0.320 8.629
edlev6 3.510 0.814 4.314
sect234 21.245 0.372 23.347
sect5 20.046 0.312 20.148
sect6 20.048 0.228 20.209
sect7 0.435 0.505 0.860
sect8 20.512 0.233 22.200
spline25 23.792 0.312 212.163
spline35 25.544 0.365 215.181
spline45 25.506 0.392 214.037
spline64 28.472 0.505 216.790
l/su 0.292 0.011 26.882
Legend:
su5standard deviation of the random effect in the random effect probit model
education level edlev 1 Primary education or less
2 Lower secondary education
3 High school ~Havo/Gymnasium completed!
4 Middle vocational ~MBO!
5 Higher vocational ~HBO!
6 University
sector of education sect 0 General education for teacher
1 Humanities, theology
2 Agriculture
3 Engineering, mathematics or physics
4 Transport, communication
5 Medical or paramedical education
6 Economics, administrative or commercial education, law
7 Sociol-cultural education
8 Education in personal/social care
9 Law and order, security/other
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APPENDIX B: CALCULATION OF PENSION WEALTH
Pension wealth is defined as the actuarially discounted sum of current and future
supplementary pension benefits. In The Netherlands, the total pension benefit of
employees consists of two parts. The first part is the social security benefit, AOW,
which has been discussed in Appendix A. The second part is a supplementary
pension benefit. The supplementary pension system is not financed on a pay-as-
you-go basis but is fully funded. In the main text it has already been indicated
that there is a great variety in supplementary pension systems because they are
organised at firm level and not at government level. However, one can fairly say
that most pension systems are of the defined benefit type and not of the defined
contribution type. Moreover, most supplementary pension systems are based on
the following rule: if one works for 40 years with the same employer, the pen-
sion benefit of a married person gross of taxes and social security premia is equal
to 70% of final pay. 17 Since retirees do not pay social security premia, the net
replacement rate amounts to 90% ~cf. Van Aalst ~1990!!. In order to simplify the
calculations we compute the net pension benefit directly by relation it to the last
earned net wage. 18 Consequently we assume an accrual rate of 2.25% per year.
The SEP does not contain much information about the pension schemes of
~ex-!employees who are younger than 65. Moreover, we do not have much in-
formation about the labor market history of the ~ex-!employee. From the SEP it
can be inferred how many years the ~ex-!employee has worked full-time and part-
time. Given this scarce information, we assume that all ~ex-!employees in the
sample participate in a pension scheme of which the net accrual rate is 2.25%.
Moreover, we assume that the pension schemes do not contain any ‘vesting’ rules.
17 Pension contributions start at age 25.
18 We realise that most pension funds first calculate the pension benefit gross of taxes on the basis
of the last earned gross wage and then withhold the taxes from the pension benefit.
TABLE A3 CONTINUED – ESTIMATION RESULTS INCOME MODEL SPOUSE, B: FIXED EF-
FECTS INCOME MODEL
Variable estimate std. error t-value
year88 20.031 0.027 21.136
year89 0.004 0.041 0.089
year90 0.131 0.048 2.741
spline25 20.088 0.157 20.563
spline35 0.022 0.284 0.077
spline45 0.970 0.425 2.283
spline64 1.318 0.723 1.822
s2 0.178
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Table B1 indicates how pension wealth is computed for seven different groups
of households. In the computation of pension wealth a real interest rate of 3%
has been assumed. The supplementary pensions are indexed on the basis of a real
growth rate of 1% ~g50.01!. 19 We have also made the same assumptions con-
cerning the survival probabilities as in the calculation of social security wealth.
Moreover, in the calculation of pension wealth we abstract from changes in fam-
ily composition due to marriage or divorce.
In order to calculate pension wealth we need to know the amount of the
supplementary pension benefits of the head and the partner. For heads and part-
ners older than 64 we observe in the SEP the amount of supplementary pensions.
For the other household groups mentioned in Table B1 we have to somehow pre-
dict the pension benefit of at least one of the household members. In principle
the following model has been used to predict the supplementary pension benefit:
PENSi5max~accrualpmin~ni,40!p~earningi2 franchise!,0! ~B1!
where PENSi5 level of supplementary pension benefits net of taxes at age 65
earnings5 ‘predicted wage level’ at age 65 net of taxes and social secu-
rity contributions
accrual5 net accrual rate ~50.0225!
ni5 the number of participation years in a pension fund ~in most
cases equal to the ~predicted! numbers of years worked in full-
time equivalents until age 65!
As we have said above, we assume that the net total pension benefit of a married
person who has worked for at least 40 years, is equal to 90% of after-tax final
pay. In other words we assume an accrual rate in net terms of 2.25% per year ~in
most pension schemes the gross accrual rate is equal to 1.75% per year!. The
franchise is equal to 10/9 times the net SS benefit of a couple. For every head of
the household and spouse observed in the SEP we have to construct the variables
‘earningsi’ and the number of participation years, ni. We distinguish the follow-
ing groups of respondents:
1. The respondent receives an early retirement pension. In line with most early
retirement schemes we assume a net replacement rate of 90 percent. Given this
assumption, earningsi is equal to 10/9 times the observed early retirement benefit
times ~11gl!65-age. 20 The number of participation years is equal to the number of
working years ~in full-time equivalents! plus half of the number of years in early
19 The way of indexing varies by pension scheme. Several pension schemes use the consumer price
index as the indexing device, whereas other pension schemes increase the yearly pension benefit on
the basis of the wage index.
20 In the calculation of pension wealth we assume that gl50.01.
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retirement. This way of computing the number of participation years is in line
with the rules applied by the pension fund of civil servants ~ABP!. Notice that in
the calculation of pension wealth, we implicitly assume that the state ‘early re-
tirement’ is absorbing. We make a similar assumption for the state ‘disability’
~see below!.
2. The respondent receives a disability benefit. Earningsi is equal to 10/8 times
the observed disability benefit times ~11gl!65-age. The number of participation
years is equal to the number of working years ~in full-time equivalents! plus the
number of years in disability.
3. The respondent receives an unemployment benefit. Earningsi is equal to 10/8
times the observed unemployment benefit ~11gl!65-age. The number of participa-
tion years is equal to the number of working years ~in full-time equivalents! plus
the length of the current unemployment spell. 21
4. The respondent does not currently work but has worked in the past. He/she
does not receive any of the wage-replacing transfers mentioned above. The num-
ber of participation years is equal to the number of working years in full-time
equivalents ~this variable has been observed in the SEP even for this type of
respondent!. 22 We have used the fixed effects wage models presented below to
predict the wage level of these respondents at the moment they stopped working
~see Table B3!. 23 We should index this wage level by a yearly increase of gl
~1%! in order to arrive at earningsi, the ‘predicted wage level’ at age 65.
5. The respondent has never worked. Pension wealth is equal to zero for this
type of respondent.
6. The respondent is an employee. 24 For this group of respondents, we need two
kinds of models in order to estimate the expected pension benefit ~cf. formula
B1!. The aim of the first model is the estimation of the transition probabilities
from work to disability and to ~early! retirement. We realise that other exit routes
are also possible. For instance, it is possible that a respondent may become un-
employed ~i.e. receive an unemployment benefit!. In order to simplify the analy-
sis, we have assumed that such persons find a new job within two years after
21 We admit that we underestimate pension wealth for this group because we do not take into ac-
count that the unemployed might work again. However, the number of respondents in this group is
rather small ~60 observations in 1988!.
22 We implicitly assume that these respondents will not work again in the future.
23 For the respondents under review we do not have estimates of the fixed effects at our disposal.
The value of the fixed effect has been predicted by using a model which explains the fixed effect,
using some non-time-varying characteristics.
24 We have removed the self-employed from the sample.
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TABLE B1 – FORMULAE OF PENSION WEALTH
Group Household type Pension Wealth
1 Single,
ageh. 565 PWi5 (
t 5 agehi
~ S11 g111 r D
t 2 agehi
phagehi,t PENSHi
2 Single,
ageh, 65 PWi5 ~11 r!agehi2 65 (
t 5 65
~ S11 g11 rD
t 2 65
phagehi,t PENSHi
3 Couple,
ageh. 5agep. 565 PWi5 (
t 5 agehi
~ S11 g11 rD
t 2 agehi
~phagehi,tPENSHi1~ppagepi,t*2phagehi,t ppagepi,t*!0.7pPENSHi1
ppagepi,t*PENSPi1 ~phagehi,t 2 phagehi,t ppagepi,t*!0.7pPENSPi
where t*5t2~ageh2agep!
4 Couple,
ageh. 565,agep, 65 PWi5 (
t 5 agehi
~ S11 g11 rD
t 2 agehi
~phagehi,t PENSHi1 ~phagepi,t* 2 phagehi,t ppagepi,t*!0.7PENSHi! 1
~11 r!agepi265 (
t 5 65
~ S11 g11 rD
t 2 65
~ppagepi,tPENSPi1~phagehi,t**2phagehi,t**ppagepi,t!PENSPi!
where t*5t2~ageh2agep!, t**5 t 2 ~agep2 ageh!
5 Couple,
agep. 565,ageh, 65
analogous to 4 ~switch agehi and agepi!
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6 Couple,
65. ageh. 5agep PWi5 ~11 r!agehi265 (
t 5 65
~ S11 g11 rD
t 2 65
~phagehi,t PENSHi1 ~ppagehi,t* 2 phagehi,t ppagepi,t*!0.7PENSHi!
1
5 ~11 r!agepi265 (
t 5 65
~ S11 g11 rD
t 2 65
~ppagepi,t PENSPi1 ~phagehi,t** 2 phagehi,t**ppagepi,t!PENSPi!
where t*5t2~ageh2agep!, t**5 t 2 ~agep2 ageh!
7 Couple,
65. agep. ageh
analogous to 6
i: 5 household index
agehi: 5 age of the head of household i
agepi: 5 age of the partner
phageh, t: 5 probability that the head of the household aged agehi still lives at age t
~survival probability of the head! 25
ppagep, t: 5 survival probability of the partner
PENSHi: 5 ~predicted! supplementary pension benefit of a the head of household at age 65 ~or in the sample year if the respondent is
older than 64!
PENSPi: 5 ~predicted! supplementary pension benefit of a the partner at age 65 ~or in the sample year if the respondent is older than
64!
g: 5 real growth rate of the pension benefit
r: 5 real interest rate
PWi: 5 pension wealth of household i
25 The survival probabilities are taken from CBS ~1992!.
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they became unemployed. According to Dutch legislation, such persons do not
‘lose’ pension rights in the sense that the length of the unemployment spell is
included in the ~expected! number of participation years. Another possibility is
that the employee leaves the labor force without receiving any benefit. Such an
exit route especially applies to married females who stop working in order to
raise children. If we take this phenomenon into account, the computation of pen-
sion wealth becomes much more complicated because such persons may re-enter
the labor market at a ~much! later stage in the life cycle. Therefore, we have
decided on selecting the sample and only including those households of which
both head and partner ~if present! are at least 30 years old. A study by Alessie,
De Vos, and Zaidi ~1996! indicates that the transition probability from ‘em-
ployee’ to ‘no benefit’ is very small for females older than 30 years.
The model which explains the transitions from work to disability and ~early!
retirement consists of two parts. The first part is a probit model and describes the
transition from ‘employee’ to ‘recipient of a disability or ~early! retirement pen-
sion.’ The following explanatory variables have been included in this model: gen-
der, dummy variables indicating educational level, dummies indicating the sector
of education and a cubic spline age function with knots at 30, 40, 50, 55, 60, and
63 years of age. This model has been estimated separately for the head of house-
hold and for the partner. The results are presented in Table B2. By means of the
second submodel the probability can be predicted whether the person who left
the labor force is an early retiree or a recipient of a disability benefit. Given the
small number of observations, we have only included dummies indicating the age
group as explanatory variables. The results are also presented in Table B2.
In order to predict the expected value of the supplementary pension benefit,
we also need models which can be used to predict wages. For the head of the
household we have chosen a fixed effects model with the following explanatory
variables: year dummies and a cubic spline age function. The model has been
estimated for three different levels of education: 1! primary or lower secondary
education, 2! higher secondary education and 3! higher than secondary education.
The October 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989 and the May 1991 waves of the SEP have
been used to estimate this model. 26,27 The estimation results are summarised in
Table B3. The wage level of the partner has also been modelled by means of ta
fixed effect specification. However, in this case we do not allow for interaction
terms between the year dummies and the cubic spline age function on the one
hand and education level dummies on the other. The estimation results are also
summarized in Table B3.
26 The May 1991 wave of the SEP contains information about the wage level prevailing in 1990.
27 Since cohort, age, and time effects cannot be disentangled, we have to make identifying assump-
tion in order to estimate the fixed effect model. We have chosen to remove one time dummy ~the
1987 time dummy!.
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TABLE B2 – ESTIMATION RESULTS TRANSITION MODELS OF HEAD AND SPOUSE,
A: PROBIT MODEL
Variable head partner
estimate std. error t-value estimate std. error t-value
gender 20.074 0.158 20.468 20.435 0.434 21.003
edlev2 20.325 0.328 20.989
edlev3 0.021 0.165 0.125
edlev4 20.338 0.175 21.934
edlev5 20.454 0.265 21.714 20.244 0.267 20.912
edlev6 20.417 0.187 22.231 20.244 0.267 20.912
sect234 20.093 0.136 20.684
sect5 20.472 0.388 21.217
sect6 20.461 0.180 22.561
sect7 20.134 0.340 20.392
sect8 0.062 0.306 0.202
spline40 0.277 0.226 1.224 0.172 0.432 0.398
spline50 0.446 0.187 2.384 0.603 0.350 1.723
spline55 0.947 0.217 4.369 0.856 0.428 2.001
spline60 2.262 0.200 11.284 2.005 0.379 5.288
spline63 1.655 0.321 5.151 0.802 0.910 0.882
constant 22.083 0.275 27.578 21.935 0.905 22.137
Legend:
education level
edlev 1 Primary education or less
2 Lower secondary education
3 High school ~Havo/Gymnasium completed!
4 Middle vocational ~MBO!
5 Higher vocational ~HBO!
6 University
sector of education
sect 0 General education for teacher
1 Humanities, theology
2 Agriculture
3 Engineering, mathematics or physics
4 Transport, communication
5 Medical or paramedical education
6 Economics, administrative or commercial education, law
7 Sociol-cultural education
8 Education in personal/social care
9 Law and order, security/other
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TABLE B2 CONTINUED – ESTIMATION RESULTS TRANSITION MODELS OF HEAD AND
SPOUSE, B: ALLOCATION BETWEEN THE STATES ‘DISABLED’ AND ‘EARLY RETIRE-
MENT’
head
Pr~early retirement! Std error
spouse
Pr~early retirement! Std error
age group
30, 5age, 550 0.000 – 0.000 –
51, age, 555 0.333 0.136 0.333 0.272
55, age, 563 0.793 0.043 0.667 0.111
TABLE B3 – ESTIMATION RESULTS WAGE EQUATION OF THE HEAD OF THE HOUSE-
HOLD AND OF THE SPOUSE
head partner
primary or lower
secondary
education
higher
secondary
education
higher than
secondary
education
year88 estimate 20.017 0.036 0.042 20.024
std error 0.017 0.015 0.022 0.027
t value 20.992 2.406 1.889 20.891
year89 estimate 0.001 0.061 0.056 0.018
std error 0.025 0.022 0.034 0.041
t value 0.046 2.715 1.660 0.450
year90 estimate 0.019 0.149 0.124 20.022
std error 0.030 0.026 0.040 0.048
t value 0.647 5.658 3.072 20.462
spline25 estimate 0.520 0.262 1.786 20.070
std error 0.107 0.119 0.155 0.153
t value 4.841 2.201 11.551 20.459
spline35 estimate 0.840 0.416 2.468 0.019
std error 0.183 0.178 0.260 0.282
t value 4.594 2.333 9.500 0.066
spline45 estimate 1.022 0.444 2.627 0.864
std error 0.268 0.249 0.371 0.426
t value 3.817 1.783 7.087 2.027
spline55 estimate 1.254 0.452 2.653 1.265
std error 0.357 0.324 0.490 0.579
t value 3.515 1.394 5.416 2.185
spline59 estimate 1.255 0.417 2.627 1.270
std error 0.397 0.362 0.544 0.657
t value 3.162 1.151 4.829 1.932
s2 0.036 0.037 0.057 0.117
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Summary
MANDATORY PENSIONS AND PERSONAL SAVINGS IN THE NETHERLANDS
The Netherlands has a relatively generous social security system and a wide coverage of individuals
by private ~occupational! pension schemes. Total household savings are rather high and fairly stable,
although the amount of contractual savings apears to be going up at the expense of non-contractual
~‘free’! savings. Using an approach originally pioneered by Feldstein ~1974! we employ microdata to
investigate the displacement effect of security and pension wealth on free household savings. It turns
out that the data available are too noisy to make precise statements about the displacement effects.
Our results do suggest, however, that a one-for-one displacement of free savings by social security is
consistent with the data. For pensions such a complete offset is less likely. This suggests that increase
of coverage by private pensions is an effective way of raising savings.
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